Fields v. Twitter, Inc. Opposition To Motion To Dismiss by unknown
 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS  
CASE NO. 3:16-CV-00213-WHO  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 
L. Timothy Fisher (State Bar No. 191626) 
Julia A. Luster (State Bar No. 295031) 
1990 North California Boulevard, Suite 940 
Walnut Creek, CA  94596 
Telephone: (925) 300-4455 
Facsimile:  (925) 407-2700 
E-Mail: ltfisher@bursor.com 
  jluster@bursor.com 
 
BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 
Scott A. Bursor (State Bar No. 276006) 
888 Seventh Avenue 
New York, NY  10019 
Telephone: (212) 989-9113 
Facsimile:  (212) 989-9163 
E-Mail: scott@bursor.com 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
TAMARA FIELDS, on behalf of herself and as  
a representative of the ESTATE OF LLOYD 
FIELDS, JR., HEATHER CREACH, on behalf 
of herself and as a representative of the ESTATE 
OF JAMES DAMON CREACH, J.C. (1), a 
minor, and J.C. (2), a minor, 
 
 Plaintiffs, 
 
 v. 
 
TWITTER, INC., 
 
 Defendant. 
 
 Case No. 3:16-cv-00213-WHO 
Hon. William H. Orrick 
 
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
 
Date: June 15, 2016 
Time: 2:00 p.m. 
Courtroom 2, 17th Floor 
 
 
 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 31   Filed 05/04/16   Page 1 of 25
 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS  i 
CASE NO. 3:16-CV-00213-WHO    
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 PAGE(S) 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1 
II. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE CDA ............................................ 2 
A. Providing Terrorists With Twitter Accounts Is Not Publishing ................................ 3 
B. Direct Messages Are Not Published .......................................................................... 9 
C. Barring Plaintiffs’ Claims Would Not Further The Goals Of The CDA ................. 11 
III. PLAINTIFFS STATE CLAIMS UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT ...................... 13 
A. Plaintiffs Adequately Plead Proximate Causation ................................................... 13 
B. Twitter Committed Acts of International Terrorism ................................................ 16 
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 20 
 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 31   Filed 05/04/16   Page 2 of 25
 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS  ii 
CASE NO. 3:16-CV-00213-WHO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 PAGE(S) 
CASES 
Abecassis v. Wyatt, 
 7 F. Supp. 3d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2014) ................................................................................... 18, 19, 20 
Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 
 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................................... 3 
Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 
 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ........................................................................................... 20 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 
 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................ passim 
Batzel v. Smith, 
 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) ................................................................................................. 11, 12 
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. ("Boim III"), 
 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................................. 14, 17, 19 
Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. ("Boim I"), 
 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) ....................................................................................................... 17 
City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, Inc., 
 624 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2010) ........................................................................................................... 7 
Diamond v. Diehr, 
 450 U.S. 175 (1981) ....................................................................................................................... 11 
Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 
 767 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................................... 6, 7 
Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Authority, 
 304 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.R.I. 2004)................................................................................................... 2 
F.T.C. v. Accusearch, Inc., 
 2007 WL 4356786 (D. Wyo. 2007) ........................................................................................... 7, 11 
Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC ("Gill I"),  
 893 F. Supp. 2d 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ............................................................................... 13, 14, 17 
Goldberg v. UBS AG, 
 690 F. Supp. 2d 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) ............................................................................................. 17 
Hare v. Richie, 
 2012 WL 3773116 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2012) .................................................................................... 3 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
 561 U.S. 1 (2010) ............................................................................................................... 11, 14, 15 
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 
 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ....................................................................................................... 12 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 31   Filed 05/04/16   Page 3 of 25
 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS  iii 
CASE NO. 3:16-CV-00213-WHO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 
 227 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 2000)............................................................................................................... 14 
Keniston v. Roberts, 
 717 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1983) ....................................................................................................... 20 
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 
 753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................. 9, 11 
Lansing v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
 980 N.E.2d 630 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) ................................................................................................ 7 
Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 
 318 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2003)........................................................................................................... 13 
Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 
 673 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2012)............................................................................................................. 17 
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 
 97 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ........................................................................... 13, 14, 17, 18 
Maracich v. Spears, 
 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013) ................................................................................................................... 13 
Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 
 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) ..................................................................................................................... 13 
Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 
 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................................... 12 
Pirozzi v. Apple Inc., 
 913 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ............................................................................................. 3 
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 
 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2013)............................................................................................................. 13 
Stansell v. BGP, Inc., 
 2011 WL 1296881 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2011) .............................................................................. 19 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 
 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)....................................................................... 8, 12 
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 
 2006 WL 2862704 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) .................................................................................. 16 
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 
 925 F. Supp. 2d 414 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ..................................................................................... 14, 17 
Tamam v. Fransabank Sal, 
 677 F. Supp. 2d 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)............................................................................................ 16 
Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 
 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014)........................................................................................................... 17 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 31   Filed 05/04/16   Page 4 of 25
 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS  iv 
CASE NO. 3:16-CV-00213-WHO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
 755 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) ................................................................................................... 19 
STATUTES 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 ....................................................................................................................... 1, 21, 22 
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(B) ................................................................................................................. 20, 23 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) ..................................................................................................................... passim 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A ....................................................................................................................... passim 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1)............................................................................................................. 1, 5, 19 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B ....................................................................................................................... passim 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) ..................................................................................................................... 22 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) ....................................................................................................................... 5 
47 U.S.C. § 230 ..................................................................................................................................... 2 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) ............................................................................................................................ 2 
 
 
 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 31   Filed 05/04/16   Page 5 of 25
 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS  1 
CASE NO. 3:16-CV-00213-WHO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For years, Twitter has knowingly permitted ISIS to sign up for accounts on its social 
network.  ISIS has used these accounts as an essential resource to support its terrorist organization.  
Through private Direct Messages, ISIS spreads extremist propaganda, raises funds and attracts new 
recruits.  The role of Twitter in the rise of ISIS cannot be overstated.  Indeed, without Twitter, ISIS’s 
dramatic emergence over the last few years into one of the most feared terrorist groups in the world 
would not have been possible.  Twitter was not an innocent bystander in all this.  It has long known 
that ISIS has been using its social network to terrorize, but has largely refused to act. 
The Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq. (“ATA”) prohibits knowingly providing 
terrorist organizations with precisely these kinds of services.  Among other things, the ATA 
prohibits providing any type of “material support or resources” to terrorists, including “any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service” such as “communications equipment.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b)(1); 
2339B(g)(4).  Congress purposefully defined “material support or resources” in a broad fashion 
because providing any assistance to terrorists frees up resources that they can use for their criminal 
and violent activities.  Even the provision of seemingly benign services (like social network 
accounts) bolsters a terrorist organization’s efficacy and strength in a community, thus undermining 
this nation’s efforts to delegitimize and weaken these groups. 
Anyone who violates the ATA’s criminal material support statutes may be held liable under 
the ATA’s private right of action, which provides the following: 
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, 
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or 
his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any 
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover 
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including attorney’s fees. 
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).  The legislative history of the ATA’s civil remedy indicates that it “was to be 
construed broadly,” and, in the words of Senator Grassley, the bill’s co-sponsor, “it empowers 
victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation.”  Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. 
Palestinian Authority, 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 265 (D.R.I. 2004) (original emphasis). 
Defendant makes two arguments in its effort to dismiss this action.  First, it argues that 
Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 
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(“CDA”).  But the CDA’s protections do not apply to this case because Plaintiffs’ cause of action 
does not seek to treat Defendant as a publisher or speaker of ISIS’s harmful messages, but rather as 
the provider of the high-tech platform through which ISIS delivered those messages.  Plaintiffs’ 
theory of liability is thus not premised on the content of tweets and does not require that Twitter be 
held responsible for content created by others, or that it otherwise be treated as a publisher or 
speaker.  Indeed, Twitter’s violation of the ATA occurred even before ISIS issued even a single 
tweet.  In addition, Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant liable for providing ISIS with access to its 
Direct Messaging capabilities.  Twitter has permitted ISIS to use this tool to send private 
communications in order to raise funds, recruit and otherwise further its extremist agenda.  Because 
these private messages are not published (i.e. not disseminated to the public), a lawsuit based on 
their content is not barred by the CDA.  Barring Plaintiffs’ claims would also contravene the CDA’s 
policy goals of encouraging free speech on the Internet or Good Samaritan filtering of offensive 
content. 
Second, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the ATA because they do 
not properly allege proximate causation or that Twitter committed an act of international terrorism.  
But Defendant misstates the law on both fronts.  Under the ATA, Plaintiffs are not required to allege 
a “direct” link between Twitter’s provision of material support to ISIS and the deaths of Lloyd 
Fields, Jr. or James Damon Creach.  Rather, because the provision of any kind of material support to 
terrorists helps them commit acts of terrorism, it is sufficient to allege that Defendant provided 
material support to ISIS and that ISIS is responsible for the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach.  
That is what Plaintiffs have done.  In addition, Plaintiffs adequately allege that Twitter committed an 
act of international terrorism because they allege that Defendant violated the ATA’s material support 
statutes, which are per se acts of international terrorism. 
For all of these reasons, and those set out below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
Amended Complaint should be denied in its entirety. 
II. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE CDA 
Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs’ claims attempt to hold Twitter liable as the ‘publisher or 
speaker’ of the content allegedly created by ISIS and its followers.”  Mot. at 14.  This is incorrect.  
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Plaintiffs’ claims are not premised on the contents of tweets, Twitter’s decision to publish or 
withdraw any published content, or any other “publishing” decisions attributable to Twitter.  Rather, 
Defendant’s violation of the ATA stems from its provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS.  Twitter also 
violated the ATA by providing ISIS with Direct Messaging capabilities so that it could send private 
communications outside the scope of the CDA.  In addition, barring Plaintiff’s claims would conflict 
with—and, indeed, detract from—the goals of the CDA.1 
A. Providing Terrorists With Twitter Accounts Is Not Publishing 
Defendant argues that the CDA bars Plaintiffs’ claims because they are based on “content 
allegedly created by ISIS and its followers.”  Mot. at 14.  But this case is not about the contents of 
tweets, the issuing of tweets or the failure to remove tweets.  It is about Defendant’s provision of 
Twitter accounts to ISIS in the first place.  In knowingly permitting ISIS to sign up for accounts on 
its social network, Twitter provided ISIS with material support in violation of the ATA.  This 
violation is not based on the publishing of offensive content.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not seek to 
hold Twitter liable as a publisher or speaker and their claims are not barred by the CDA. 
The protections of the CDA apply only when a claim seeks to treat a defendant as a 
“publisher or speaker.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 
2009) (Courts must determine whether “a plaintiff’s theory of liability would treat a defendant as a 
publisher or speaker of third-party content.”).  “To put it another way, courts must ask whether the 
duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as 
a ‘publisher or speaker.’”  Id. at 1102.   Under the CDA, “what matters is whether the cause of action 
inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided 
                                                 
1 At the very least, Defendant’s argument under the CDA is premature.  Courts have not hesitated to 
decline ruling on such arguments at the pleadings stage when a more complete record would help 
evaluate arguments under the CDA.  See, e.g., Pirozzi v. Apple Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 840, 849 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (“[B]ased on the scant record before the Court, it is premature to decide whether the CDA 
bars Plaintiff’s claims . . . . [T]he Court cannot make that determination based on the allegations in 
the CAC.”); Hare v. Richie, 2012 WL 3773116, at *19 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2012) (“I am mindful of the 
Fourth Circuit’s admonition that § 230(c)(1) immunity should be resolved at an early opportunity.  
Nevertheless, ‘a court is entitled to have before it a proper record, sufficiently developed through 
discovery proceedings, to accurately assess any claim, including one of immunity.  And even a party 
whose assertion of immunity ultimately proves worthy must submit to the burdens of litigation until 
a court becomes sufficiently informed to rule.’”) (quoting Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 
205, 220 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).  
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by another.”  Id. at 1102.  A publisher is one who “reviews material submitted for publication, 
perhaps edits it for style or technical fluency, and then decides whether to publish it.”  Id.  
Here, Plaintiffs’ claims are not premised on Defendant’s role as a publisher or speaker of 
content, but rather its provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS in the first place.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A 
prohibits providing material support or resources with the knowledge that they are to be used in 
preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of specific violent crimes.  Likewise, 18 U.S.C. § 
2339B prohibits knowingly providing material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization (“FTO”) such as ISIS.  Both of these statutes broadly define “material support or 
resources” as: 
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, 
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false 
documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more 
individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except 
medicine or religious materials 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (emphasis supplied); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4).  A Twitter account 
constitutes “material support or resources” under this definition because it is tangible or intangible 
property.  Accordingly, Twitter violated the ATA’s material support statutes—and became liable 
under the ATA’s civil remedies provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)—the moment it permitted ISIS to 
create an account on its social network.  Because the creation of a Twitter account necessarily occurs 
before the issuing of tweets from that account, and separately from the creation of published content, 
Defendant’s violations of the ATA cannot be accurately characterized as publishing activity, but 
rather the provision of the means through which ISIS spreads its poison. 
 In this same vein, the Amended Complaint focuses on Defendant’s provision of Twitter 
accounts to ISIS, not the contents of tweets: 
• Since first appearing on Twitter in 2010, ISIS accounts on Twitter 
have grown at an astonishing rate and, until recently, ISIS maintained 
official accounts on Twitter unfettered.  These official accounts 
included media outlets, regional hubs and well-known ISIS members, 
some with tens of thousands of followers.  FAC ¶ 3. 
• Likewise, Al-Hayat Media Center, ISIS’s official public relations 
group, maintained at least a half dozen accounts, emphasizing the 
recruitment of Westerners.  As of June 2014, Al-Hayat had nearly 
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20,000 followers.  Id. ¶ 4. 
• Another Twitter account, @ISIS_Media_Hub, had 8,954 followers as 
of September 2014.  Id. ¶ 5. 
• As of December 2014, ISIS had an estimated 70,000 Twitter accounts, 
at least 79 of which were “official,” and it posted at least 90 tweets 
every minute.  Id. ¶ 6. 
• ISIS reaches potential recruits by maintaining accounts on Twitter so 
that individuals across the globe may reach out to them directly.  Id. ¶ 
20. 
• Even when Twitter shuts down an ISIS-linked account, it does nothing 
to stop it from springing right back up.  According to the New York 
Times, the Twitter account of the pro-ISIS group Asawitiri Media has 
had 335 accounts.  When its account @TurMedia333 was shut down, 
it started @TurMedia334.  When that was shut down, it started 
@TurMedia335.  This “naming convention—adding one digit to a new 
account after the last one is suspended—does not seem as if it would 
require artificial intelligence to spot.”  Id. ¶ 69. 
• Notably, while Twitter has now put in place a rule that supposedly 
prohibits “threats of violence . . . including threatening or promoting 
terrorism,” many ISIS-themed accounts are still easily found on 
Twitter.com.  To this day, Twitter also permits groups designated by 
the U.S. government as Foreign Terrorist Organizations to maintain 
official accounts, including Hamas (@hamasinfo and @HamasInfoEn) 
and Hizbollah (@almanarnews).  Id. ¶ 70. 
Where, as here, a plaintiff’s theory of liability is not dependent on a defendant’s role as a 
publisher, courts do not hesitate to rule that the CDA does not apply.  For example, in Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), the plaintiff filed a promissory estoppel claim against 
defendant Yahoo because she had relied on its promise that it would remove private information and 
photographs that her ex-boyfriend had posted.  Id. at 1098-99.  The Ninth Circuit held that this claim 
was not barred by the CDA because plaintiff did “not seek to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or 
speaker of third-party content, but rather as the counter-party to a contract, as a promisor who has 
breached.”  Id. at 1107.  This “[c]ontract liability” did not arise from “Yahoo’s publishing conduct, 
but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be legally obligated to do something, which happens to be 
removal of material from publication.”  Id. 
Similarly, in Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2014), plaintiff 
brought a negligent failure to warn claim based on her allegation that defendant knew rapists were 
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using its website to lure victims.2  The court ruled that such a claim was not barred by the CDA 
because it “ha[d] nothing to do with Internet Brands’ efforts, or lack thereof, to edit or remove user 
generated content”: 
[T]hat Internet Brands was in some sense an “intermediary” between 
Jane Doe and the rapists does not mean that the failure to warn claim 
treats Internet Brands as the publisher or speaker of user content. . . .  
                                                 
2 This opinion was withdrawn, apparently because the panel effectively permitted plaintiff to amend 
her pleadings at oral argument on appeal.  It is cited here for its persuasive reasoning, not its 
precedential value.  Nevertheless, at the rehearing held on April 8, 2015, the panel persisted in its 
view that while the CDA bars claims that seek to hold a defendant liable as a publisher, it does not 
cover all claims that are somehow related to publishing activity.  Judge Cogan, for instance, noted 
the following: 
But then what you’re saying is that everything related in any way to 
publication or speaking that your client does cannot give rise to 
liability.  And if Congress wanted to give that kind of blanket 
immunity, why couldn’t it simply say the provider shall be immune for 
any act arising from, or relating to its publishing activity?  They didn’t 
say that.  There must be something that’s not covered. . . .  [T]he 
Barnes case had a special fact, and the special fact was one of the 
employees of the provider made a promise; that’s not part of its         
publishing.  Here, there’s a special fact also which is that the 
company came into knowledge of these particular abusers.  That 
doesn’t happen all the time, and so I’m less worried about opening the 
flood gates than you are.  This is a pretty strange fact pattern, it seems, 
to me. . . .  That’s my difficulty with your position.  It’s not just the 
publishing.  It’s the fact that during an acquisition, lawyers did a 
review of a file, and they found in the file a particular fact.  That’s not 
part of publication; that’s the due diligence that any company would 
do in acquiring another company. 
Jane Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., Apr. 8, 2015 Unofficial Tr. at 21:10-23:24 (emphasis 
added).  Judge Clifton likewise questioned whether the CDA was intended to cover knowing 
violations of law: 
And Congress intended to say and you don’t have to let anybody else 
know that you’ve got this knowledge that bad stuff’s going on out 
there? . . .  In a provision labeled “Good Samaritan”? . . .  I have 
trouble looking at the statute seeing how a provision that’s entitled . . . 
“Protection for a Good Samaritan blocking and screening offensive 
materials” gets turned into a hall pass, a get out of jail free card when 
it has something to do with the Internet. 
Id. at 33:25-34:6; 39:19-40:2.  Patrick Carome, counsel for Twitter in this matter, who was then 
acting as counsel for Amicus Curiae Computer and Communications Industry Association, likewise 
admitted the limitations of the CDA: “It is not immunity, as we know from Barnes, when there’s an 
independent legal event – independently significant legal event like a contract, or the equivalent of a 
contract that’s enforceable in law to be created.”  Id. at 40:7-12. 
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We have already held that the CDA does not declare “a general 
immunity from liability deriving from third-party content.” Barnes, 
570 F.3d at 1100. Congress has not provided an all purpose get-out-of-
jail-free card for businesses that publish user content on the internet, 
though any claims might have a marginal chilling effect on internet 
publishing businesses. . . .  Barring Jane Doe’s failure to warn claim 
would stretch the CDA beyond its narrow language and its purpose. 
Id. at 899.  See also Lansing v. Sw. Airlines Co., 980 N.E.2d 630, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) 
(“Plaintiff’s negligent supervision cause of action does not require publishing or speaking as a 
critical element, and holding defendant liable for its failure to supervise its employee after defendant 
had received notice of the employee’s wrongful conduct does not treat defendant as if it were the 
publisher or speaker of the alleged e-mails and texts.”); F.T.C. v. Accusearch, Inc., 2007 WL 
4356786, at *5 (D. Wyo. 2007) (Claim for unfair trade practices did “not seek to ‘treat’ Defendants 
as a publisher within the meaning of the CDA” because it arose out of the fact that defendant 
“advertised the availability of phone records, solicited orders, purchased the records from third-party 
sources for a fee, and then resold them to the end-consumers.”); City of Chicago, Ill. v. StubHub!, 
Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010) (CDA did not apply because “Chicago’s amusement tax does 
not depend on who ‘publishes’ any information or is a ‘speaker,’ . . . Section 230(c) is irrelevant.”) 
Just like in these cases, Plaintiffs’ claim does not turn on Defendant’s role as a publisher or 
speaker.  Defendant’s liability does not arise out of its publishing conduct, but rather its separate 
legal duty under the ATA not to provide terrorists with material support.  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107.  
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ claims “do[] not require publishing or speaking as a critical element.”  Lansing, 
980 N.E.2d at 639.  In no sense was Defendant acting as a publisher when it permitted ISIS members 
to sign up for and create these accounts.  It was not reviewing, revising or editing content.  Nor was 
it deciding whether content should be publicly disseminated or withdrawn from the Internet.  
Plaintiffs’ claims are not premised on a theory that any particular tweets from ISIS members should 
have been altered or restricted in any way.  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ claims under the ATA are not based 
on offending content at all.  They are based on Twitter’s provision of material support to ISIS, which 
is separate and apart from—and antecedent to—the publication of any content.  Even if ISIS had 
never issued a single tweet, Defendant’s provision of material support to ISIS in the form of Twitter 
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accounts would constitute a violation of the ATA.3   
Plaintiffs’ claims are likewise not based on Defendant’s publishing activity because Twitter’s 
duty not to provide material support to terrorists is not based on its role as a publisher, but rather its 
knowledge that it was providing material support to ISIS—knowledge that it acquired independently 
of its publishing activity.  Twitter is liable under the ATA only because it knew that it was providing 
material support to ISIS, but did so anyway.  As set out in the Amended Complaint, the use of 
Twitter by terrorists has been widely reported in the media.  FAC ¶¶ 48-56.  Since at least 2011, 
major media outlets like the New York Times, USA Today, CNN and Time Magazine all wrote 
articles on the use of Twitter by ISIS and other terrorist organizations.  Id.  The Amended Complaint 
also includes allegations that politicians and other critics have long been urging Twitter to do more 
to keep ISIS off of its social network.  Id. ¶¶ 57-62.  There have been committee hearings in 
Congress about Twitter’s provision of material support to ISIS and even the White House and 
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have urged Twitter to do more to block terrorists from 
accessing its services.  Id.  Twitter has also made several statements over the years indicating that it 
was aware that ISIS was using its social network but that it would decline to kick them off for 
ideological reasons.  Id. ¶¶ 63-70.  Because Plaintiffs’ claims under the ATA are premised on 
Twitter’s knowledge that it was providing material support to ISIS—knowledge that it derived from 
outside of its own website and outside of its publishing activities—the CDA does not bar their 
claims. 
Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014) is inapposite.  In that case, the 
plaintiff brought claims against Facebook for intentional assault and negligence based on his 
                                                 
3 Plaintiffs’ allegations differ markedly from the typical case in which the CDA applies.  “The cause 
of action most frequently associated with the cases on section 230 is defamation.”  Barnes v. Yahoo!, 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009).  “This is not surprising, because . . . Congress enacted the 
Amendment in part to respond to a New York state court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished), which held that an 
internet service provider could be liable for defamation.”  Id.  The CDA was thus meant to protect 
interactive computer services from being sued for their role in publishing defamatory content.  Here, 
however, Plaintiffs are not seeking to hold Defendant liable for the speech of ISIS.  Rather, it is 
Twitter’s provision of a powerful communications tool in the first place that constitutes a violation 
of the ATA.  Handing a megaphone to a terrorist group constitutes the provision of material support, 
regardless of what the terrorists communicate with that tool. 
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allegation that it “delay[ed] in removing” a page on its social network encouraging a Third Intifada.  
The court ruled that such claims sought to hold Facebook liable as a publisher because “the very 
essence of publishing is making the decision whether to print or retract a given piece of content.”  Id. 
at 1359.  In contrast, Plaintiffs’ allegations in the case at hand are not about a decision by Twitter to 
issue or remove particular tweets or any other content.  Rather, they allege a violation of the ATA 
that is antecedent to any publishing activity whatsoever.  As set out more fully below, this case also 
differs from Klayman because it involves private communications in the form of Direct Messages—
communications that are not published. 
B. Direct Messages Are Not Published 
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant is liable under the ATA because it provided ISIS with 
Direct Message capabilities.  FAC ¶ 20-22.  Because Direct Messages are unpublished private 
communications, this theory of liability does not seek to treat Defendant as a publisher or speaker 
and, accordingly, the CDA does not apply. 
As Twitter acknowledges, Direct Messages sent through its social network are private 
communications: 
Direct Messages are the private side of Twitter. . . .  Communicate 
quickly and privately with one person or many.  Direct Messages 
support text, photos, links, emoji and Tweets, so you can make your 
point however you please. . . .  Have a private conversation with 
anyone on Twitter, even a friend of a friend.  Direct messages can only 
be seen between the people included. 
Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added).  Twitter also advertises its Direct Messaging tool by stressing privacy: 
 
 
  
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 31   Filed 05/04/16   Page 14 of 25
 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS  10 
CASE NO. 3:16-CV-00213-WHO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
 
Id. ¶¶ 21-22. 
ISIS has used these Direct Messages to its great advantage.  “ISIS reaches potential recruits 
by maintaining accounts on Twitter so that individuals across the globe may reach out to them 
directly.  After first contact, potential recruits and ISIS recruiters often communicate via Twitter’s 
Direct Messaging capabilities.”  Id. ¶ 20.   
These Direct Messages are “extensively monitored by [ISIS’s] emirs 
and supervisors of the recruiting unit.”  According to FBI Director 
James Comey, “[o]ne of the challenges in facing this hydra-headed 
monster is that if (ISIS) finds someone online, someone who might be 
willing to travel or kill in place they will begin a twitter direct 
messaging contact.”  Indeed, according to the Brookings Institution, 
some ISIS members “use Twitter purely for private messaging or 
covert signaling.”  ISIS has also been known to use Twitter’s Direct 
Messaging capabilities for fundraising and operational purposes. . . .   
Through its Direct Messaging tool, Twitter enables ISIS members to 
receive private Direct Messages from potential recruits, terrorist 
financiers and other terrorists with operational and intelligence 
information.  Giving ISIS the capability to send and receive Direct 
Messages in this manner is no different to handing it a satellite phone, 
walkie-talkies or the use of a mail drop, all of which terrorists use for 
private communications in order to further their extremist agendas. 
Id. ¶¶ 21-22. 
This theory of liability, based on purely private content, is not barred by the CDA because it 
does not involve publishing.  Publishing necessarily involves the dissemination of information to the 
public.  Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 (“Although the [CDA] does not define ‘publisher,’ its ordinary 
meaning is ‘one that makes public,’ and ‘the reproducer of a work intended for public 
consumption.’”) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1837 (1981)); Publish 
Definition, merriam-webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/publish (last visited 
May 4, 2016) (“to disseminate to the public”); Publish Definition, Dictionary.com, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/publish (last visited May 4, 2016) (“to issue . . . for sale or 
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distribution to the public”; “to issue publicly the work of”; “to make publicly or generally known”); 
Publish Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary (2d Pocket Ed.) (“To distribute copies (of a work) to the 
public.”); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (in construing a statute, “[u]nless 
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning”).   
As the protections of the CDA are limited to an interactive computer service’s publishing 
activities, that statute does not apply to lawsuits based on content that is intended to be private.  
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033-35 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The congressional objectives in passing § 
230 therefore are not furthered by providing immunity in instances where posted material was 
clearly not meant for publication.”); Accusearch, 2007 WL 4356786, at *4-5 (claims based on 
defendants’ sale of confidential customer phone records did not treat defendants as publishers). 
C. Barring Plaintiffs’ Claims Would Not Further The Goals Of The CDA 
Barring Plaintiffs’ claims in this case would be at odds with the purported goals of the CDA.  
First, in passing the CDA, “Congress wanted to encourage the unfettered and unregulated 
development of free speech on the Internet.”  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027; id. at 1033 (Congress was 
“concern[ed] with assuring a free market in ideas and information on the Internet.”).  But Congress 
surely did not intend to promote speech that aids designated terrorist organizations.  To the contrary, 
it expressly prohibited such speech through the ATA’s material support provisions.  18 U.S.C. §§ 
2339A-B (defining “material support or resources” to include “training, expert advice” and 
“communications equipment”).  Numerous courts have held that that violations of the ATA’s 
material support statutes do not implicate free speech concerns.  See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (the ATA’s prohibition on providing material support to 
terrorists in the form of legal and political advocacy training is constitutional because such a ban is 
necessary to further the “[g]overnment’s interest in combating terrorism,” which “is an urgent 
objective of the highest order”); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1194 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“There are, of course, certain types of speech that do not fall within the protection of the First 
Amendment, such as . . . speech that materially assists a foreign terrorist organization.”); Holy Land 
Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding “as other courts 
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have,” that “there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support 
terrorists”).  Accordingly, nothing about the allegations in this lawsuit infringe upon Congress’s goal 
of promoting free speech on the Internet.  To the contrary, barring Plaintiffs’ claims in this case 
would directly contradict the express language of the ATA and expand the reach of the CDA far 
beyond its intended purpose.  Nor would allowing this case to go forward have a “chilling effect” on 
Internet free speech.  Rather, at most, it would deter interactive computer services from knowingly 
providing material support to terrorists. 
Second, Congress enacted the CDA in order “to encourage interactive computer services and 
users of such services to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material. . . .”  
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028.  The CDA was enacted in large part in reaction to the decision in Stratton 
Oakmont, where the court held that Prodigy could be held responsible for libelous statements posted 
on one of its bulletin boards because it had proactively monitored that forum for offensive content.  
1995 WL 323710, at *1-4.  But this is not a case that has anything to do with Twitter’s efforts, or 
lack thereof, to edit or remove user generated content.  Nothing about this case should discourage 
“Good Samaritan” filtering of third party content.  Indeed, it defies credulity that a section entitled 
“Protection For ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking And Screening Of Offensive Material” would create 
immunity for the knowing provision of material support to a terrorist organization.  Such an 
interpretation of the CDA would expand that law far beyond its narrow language and purpose. 
Various canons of statutory interpretation further counsel against a ruling that the CDA bars 
Plaintiffs’ claims.  First, such a ruling should be avoided because it would needlessly create a 
conflict between the CDA’s protections for interactive computer services and the ATA’s prohibition 
on providing material support to terrorists.  See Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2205 (2013) 
(“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not 
contradictory. . . .  [T]here can be no justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if 
they can be interpreted harmoniously.”) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts (“Scalia/Garner”) 180 (2012)).  But a ruling that the scope of the CDA 
does not cover the ATA violations alleged in this case would maintain a harmonious reading of the 
two statutes.  In addition, the CDA’s general language stating that “an interactive computer service” 
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should not “be treated as the publisher or speaker” must give way to the ATA’s specific prohibitions 
against providing material support to terrorists, including in the form of “communications 
equipment.”  Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 504 (2012) (referring to “the 
ancient interpretive principle that the specific governs the general (generalia specialibus non 
derogant )”); Scalia/Garner 185 (“[T]he [general/specific] canon does apply to successive statutes.”). 
III. PLAINTIFFS STATE CLAIMS UNDER THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT  
A. Plaintiffs Adequately Plead Proximate Causation 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege proximate causation because 
“nothing that Twitter allegedly did can plausibly be said to have ‘led directly’” to the deaths of 
Lloyd Fields, Jr. or James Damon Creach.  Mot. at 21.  But this argument both misstates the 
applicable law and ignores Twitter’s role in the rise of ISIS.  The material support that Twitter has 
provided to ISIS more than adequately satisfies the ATA’s proximate causation requirement. 
Proximate causation is established under the ATA when a defendant’s “acts were a 
substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation,” and the injury at issue “was reasonably 
foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence.”4  Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (quoting Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2003)); Linde v. Arab 
Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The causation charge the Court gave focused 
solely on whether defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs’ injuries, and 
whether such injuries were a foreseeable result of those acts.”).  “A proximate cause determination 
does not require a jury to identify the liable party as the sole cause of harm; it only asks that the 
identified cause be a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.”  Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. 
Supp. 2d 474, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Gill I”) (quoting Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power 
Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
Importantly, there is no “directness” requirement for proximate causation under the ATA.  
                                                 
4 Notably, the ATA does not require but-for causation.  Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 
287, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“As the only cases to directly address the issue have held, requiring ‘but 
for’ causation would effectively annul the civil liability provisions of the ATA.  That cannot have 
been the intent of Congress in enacting them.”); Gill I, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (“‘But for’ cause 
cannot be required in the section 2333(a) context.”). 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 31   Filed 05/04/16   Page 18 of 25
 PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS  14 
CASE NO. 3:16-CV-00213-WHO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[P]roposed language [for the 
jury instructions] concerning the ‘directness’ of the relation between plaintiffs’ injury and 
defendant’s acts was inappropriate in the ATA context.”).  In cases involving the provision of 
financial support to terrorist organizations, courts have refused to impose a “directness” requirement 
for proximate causation under the ATA because money is fungible.  See, e.g., Boim v. Holy Land 
Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690-91 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Boim III”) (“Because money is 
fungible, the combination of the link to Hamas and the receipt of an amount that would have been 
sufficient to finance the shooting at the Beit El bus stop would be enough to show that the ‘material 
assistance’ of giving money caused the terrorist act that took David Boim’s life.”) (Posner, J.); 
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 433–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[P]laintiffs who 
bring an ATA action are not required to trace specific dollars to specific attacks to satisfy the 
proximate cause standard.  Such a task would be impossible and would make the ATA practically 
dead letter because ‘[m]oney is fungible.’”) (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
1, 30 (2010)); Gill I, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (“The money used need not be shown to have been used 
to purchase the bullet that struck the plaintiff.  A contribution, if not used directly, arguably would 
be used indirectly by substituting it for money in [ISIS’s] treasury. . . .”).   
As the Supreme Court has noted, non-financial forms of material support to terrorists are just 
as fungible.  In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), plaintiffs sought a 
preliminary injunction because they wished to provide legal and political advocacy training to 
designated terrorist organizations, but feared that they would be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B 
for providing material support to FTOs.  Id. at 10.  The Supreme Court considered “whether the 
Government may prohibit” the provision of “material support to [terrorists] in the form of speech,” 
and focused on whether a ban on the kind of material support at issue was necessary to further the 
Government’s interest in combatting terrorism.  Id. at 28.  The Supreme Court, following the lead of 
Congress, determined that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by 
their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”  Id. at 
29 (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 
1247, note following 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Findings and Purpose)) (original emphasis).  The court 
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likewise deferred to the expertise of the State Department which found that “all contributions to 
foreign terrorist organizations further their terrorism,” and that “it is highly likely that any material 
support to these organizations will ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist 
functions—regardless of whether such support was ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-
terrorist activities.”  Id. at 33. 
“Material support,” the court reasoned, “is a valuable resource by definition.”  Id. at 30. 
Such support frees up other resources within the organization that may 
be put to violent ends.  It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to 
foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those 
groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—all of which 
facilitate more terrorist attacks. . . .  Indeed, some designated foreign 
terrorist organizations use social and political components to recruit 
personnel to carry out terrorist operations, and to provide support to 
criminal terrorists and their families in aid of such operations. 
Id. at 30-31 (quotation marks omitted).  It is thus unsurprising that the ATA’s material support 
statutes prohibit not only providing money to terrorists groups, but also “any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service,” which expressly includes “communications equipment.”  18 U.S.C. 
2339A(b)(1).  “The material-support statute is, on its face, a preventive measure—it criminalizes not 
terrorist attacks themselves, but aid that makes the attacks more likely to occur.”  Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. at 35. 
Under the standard for proximate causation set out in other ATA cases, Plaintiffs adequately 
allege that Twitter provided invaluable support to ISIS and thereby proximately caused the deaths of 
Lloyd Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach.  Twitter has permitted ISIS to use its social network “as 
a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and attracting new recruits.”  Id. ¶ 1.  
Twitter even knowingly permitted ISIS to maintain dozens of official accounts with tens of 
thousands of followers.  Id. ¶ 3.  Twitter also gave ISIS access to its Direct Messaging capabilities 
which it used for “covert signaling” as well as “fundraising and operational purposes.”  Id. ¶ 21.   
The value of the material support that Twitter provided to ISIS cannot be overstated.  
“Without Twitter, the explosive growth of ISIS over the last few years into the most-feared terrorist 
group in the world would not have been possible.”  Id. ¶ 2.  Over just the last year, ISIS has used 
Twitter to recruit more than 30,000 foreign fighters, “including 4,500 Westerners and 250 
Americans.”  Id. ¶ 29.  ISIS has also been able to use Twitter to raise untold sums from its supporters 
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around the world.  Id. ¶¶ 21, 22, 30-34.  And, perhaps above all else, Twitter has enabled ISIS to 
effectuate one of the most widespread effective propaganda campaigns in history.  Id. ¶¶ 35-47. 
This material support from Twitter not only enabled ISIS to raise funds and recruit new 
members, but it also freed up resources for ISIS to carry out numerous terrorist attacks like the one 
at issue in this case.  Because of its access to and use of Twitter, ISIS was able to spend substantially 
less time, money and other resources on winning hearts and minds through charity work and media 
outlets as many other terrorist organizations do.  See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 2006 WL 
2862704, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006) (describing Hamas’s “social wing,” known as the “Dawa,” 
which combines “charitable and social institutions”); Tamam v. Fransabank Sal, 677 F. Supp. 2d 
720, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the television station Al-Manar and radio station Al-Nour, 
both run by Hizbullah, are designated Specially Designated Global Terrorists (“SDGT”)).  ISIS was 
also able to save money on communications equipment like radios and phones.  As a result, ISIS was 
able to redirect its resources from recruiting new members and raising money to planning and 
organizing attacks, and to purchasing guns, ammunition and other items necessary for carrying out 
acts of terrorism, including the attack in which Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach were killed. 
B. Twitter Committed Acts of International Terrorism 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that it “committed an ‘act of 
international terrorism” because “even as alleged, Twitter’s conduct does not objectively ‘appear to 
[have been] intended’ to achieve a terrorism purpose.”  Mot. at 23-24.  That is because, according to 
Defendant, “[n]o reasonable observer could conclude that Twitter’s worldwide operation of its 
communications platform was intended ‘to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,’ ‘to influence 
the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion,’ or ‘to affect the conduct of a government by 
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.’”  Mot. at 25 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(B)).  This 
argument misstates the applicable law. 
The ATA’s civil remedies create a private right of action for “[a]ny national of the United 
States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international 
terrorism. . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).  Violations of each of the ATA’s material support provisions 
(18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-B) constitute acts of international terrorism for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 
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2333(a).  See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 68-69 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“The Seventh Circuit, and several district courts in this Circuit, have concluded that a defendant’s 
violation of the criminal material-support statutes, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-C, constitutes an act of 
‘international terrorism’ within the meaning of section 2331(1).”) (citing Boim v. Quranic Literacy 
Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Boim I”)); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 
2d 414, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Violations of Sections 2339B and 2339C are considered to be acts of 
‘international terrorism’ under Section 2333(a).”).  For example, in Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. 
Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), when the defendant made the same argument raised here and insisted 
that the jury should have been “charged on each constituent element of an ‘act of international 
terrorism’ under 18 U.S.C. § 2331,” including that the bank’s actions must “‘appear to be intended’ 
to intimidate a civilian population, influence government policy, or affect the conduct of government 
by certain specified means,” the court held that such a charge was improper.  Id. at 322. (“I agree 
with those courts that have held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B is itself an act of international 
terrorism.”).  Likewise, here, because Plaintiffs adequately allege that Defendant knowingly 
provided material support to ISIS in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-B, they also sufficiently allege 
that Defendant committed an act of international terrorism for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 2333(a).5  No 
further inquiry is necessary. 
Even if Plaintiffs are required to allege that Defendant intended “to achieve a terrorism 
purpose,” Mot. at 23-24, they have done so.  A defendant’s actions “appear to be intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnaping 
                                                 
5 “[T]he scienter standards for” for the material support provisions and “§ 2333(a) are one and the 
same.”  Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).  That is, “a plaintiff 
must prove that a defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.”  Gill I, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 
503; Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[S]ections 2339A and 2339B 
make clear Congress’ intent that the intentional (or reckless) provision of material support to a 
terrorist organization fulfills each prong of Section 2331(1)’s definition of ‘international terrorism,’ 
and therefore suffice to establish liability under Section 2333(a).”); Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank 
PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2014) (“For the purposes of § 2339B(a)(1), a defendant has 
knowledge that an organization engages in terrorist activity if the defendant has actual knowledge of 
such activity or if the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to whether the organization 
engages in such activity.”); Boim III, 549 F.3d at 693 (a state of mind of criminal recklessness is 
sufficient for a violation of Section 2339A as incorporated into Section 2333(a)). 
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when a [defendant] knows the terroristic aims and activities of its recipient and when it is 
foreseeable that [its actions] will advance such terroristic aims.”  Abecassis v. Wyatt, 7 F. Supp. 3d 
668, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2014).  Whether a defendant committed an act of international terrorism 
“distill[s] to relatively simple questions”: 
Did the defendant know that it was providing material support to [a 
terrorist organization], and did the defendant know that [the terrorist 
organization] was a foreign terrorist organization (or ‘engaged in 
terrorist activity’ or ‘terrorism’)?  If those are the only questions that 
need be answered to determine whether a defendant committed an ‘act 
of international terrorism’ with the requisite mental state—and they 
are—then they are the only questions a jury should be asked.  
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).   
Here, both questions must be answered in the affirmative.  Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is 
replete with allegations that Defendant has not only been aware of ISIS’s use of its communications 
platform for terroristic purposes since at least December 2011, but that it has also affirmatively 
refused to take any action to thwart such use.  See FAC ¶¶ 48-70.  For instance, “[o]n June 20, 2014, 
Twitter founder Biz Stone, responding to media questions about ISIS’s use of Twitter to publicize its 
acts of terrorism, said, ‘[i]f you want to create a platform that allows for the freedom of expression 
for hundreds of millions of people around the world, you really have to take the good with the bad.’”  
Id. ¶ 65.   
These allegations establish that Defendant continued providing material support in the form 
of a communications platform to ISIS despite having allegedly been aware of a substantial 
probability that its support would facilitate the planning, preparation for, and execution of terrorist 
attacks worldwide.  As such, these allegations are sufficient to allow a reasonable person to infer that 
Defendant shared ISIS’s intent to achieve a terrorism purpose:  
Based on the[] allegations [that BOC knowingly continued to carry out 
the PIJ Transfers after being expressly warned of the consequences of 
its actions and asked to desist], the Court easily finds that the plaintiffs 
have sufficiently pled grounds from which an objective observer could 
conclude defendant BOC intended to achieve any of the three results 
set forth under § 2331(1)(B).  …  Although directly attributable to the 
PIJ, a reasonable person could easily infer similar intent of BOC by 
virtue of its having allegedly provided material support to PIJ despite 
having allegedly been aware of a substantial probability that its 
support would facilitate the planning, preparation for, and execution of 
terrorist attacks in Israel.  Cf. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 708 (noting that 
mere financial support of a Hamas-affiliated charity without reason to 
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impute intent from the charity to the financier did not create the 
requisite appearance of intent).  Plaintiffs have thus adequately pled 
appearance of intent by BOC to achieve goals similar to those of the 
PIJ. 
Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 49 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasis added); see also 
Abecassis v. Wyatt, 7 F. Supp. 3d 668, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (“In this case, the terrorist attacks at 
issue in Israel, by their nature, were intended to intimidate and coerce the Israeli population and 
influence the policies of the Israeli government by intimidation, coercion, and mass destruction. . . .  
[T]he continued financial and material support outside of the regulations of the OFP by the 
defendants to the Hussein regime, which was known to fund terrorist acts in Israel, could lead an 
objective observer to infer that such donations appeared to be intended to accomplish terroristic 
aims.  Plaintiffs’ allegations in their first amended complaint satisfy the minimum pleading 
requirements for this element of their ATA claims.”).6 
 While Defendant compares its activities to the provision of “routine banking service[s],” 
Mot. at 24, presumably it is not “routine” for interactive computer services to knowingly provide 
material support to terrorists.  This case is thus no different from Arab Bank: 
Nothing in the amended complaints suggests that Arab Bank is a mere 
unknowing conduit for the unlawful acts of others, about whose aims 
the Bank is ignorant.  Given plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the 
knowing and intentional nature of the Bank’s activities, there is 
nothing “routine” about the services the Bank is alleged to have 
                                                 
6 Defendant also contends that “[e]ven where the alleged ‘material support’ was targeted specifically 
to a terrorist organization . . . courts have concluded the requisite terrorism intent is lacking where 
the context ‘would . . . lead an objective observer to conclude’ that the defendant sought to achieve 
some other objective.”  Mot. at 25 n.11 (quoting Stansell v. BGP, Inc., 2011 WL 1296881, at *9 
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2011).  However, Stansell is the only case to reach this conclusion.  As noted 
above, the vast majority of courts look only to whether a plaintiff alleges a violation of the material 
support statutes for determining if the “international terrorism” element is properly plead.  
Moreover, the lone court to have considered the holding in Stansell criticized and rejected its 
reasoning.  In Abecassis v. Wyatt, 7 F. Supp. 3d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2014), the court noted that “[w]hile 
the [Stansell] court found an objective observer could not conclude defendants intended to achieve 
any of the results listed in the statute, the court relied on the subjective intent of the defendants as 
pled by the plaintiffs.”  Id. at 676.  In any event, the Abecassis court found, “the continued financial 
and material support” of oil and gas companies “outside of the regulations of the [Oil for Food 
Program]” to the regime of Saddam Hussein, “which was known to fund terrorist acts in Israel, could 
lead an objective observer to infer that such donations appeared to be intended to accomplish 
terroristic aims.”  Id.  Likewise, in this case, Twitter’s knowing provision of material support to the 
well-known terrorist group ISIS could lead an objective observer to infer that the company intended 
to accomplish terroristic aims. 
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provided.  Thus, plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to Arab Bank’s 
knowledge and conduct are sufficient under their first factual theory. 
Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied in all respects. 
Alternatively, if the motion is granted in any respect, Plaintiff should be given leave to amend.  See, 
e.g., Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Ordinarily, leave to amend should 
be freely given in the absence of prejudice to the opposing party. . . . In the absence of such a reason, 
denial of leave to amend is an abuse of discretion and reversible.”). 
 
Dated:  May 4, 2016   Respectfully submitted, 
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